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Technology licensing in a differentiated oligopoly

1. Introduction
Technology licensing is an important element of conduct in many industries and has
attracted a fair amount of attention in the industrial organization literature. The
seminal papers by Kamien and Tauman (1984 and 1986) show that, if an innovator,
who is not a producer, 1 licenses a technology to the final goods producers and the
product market is characterized by Cournot competition, licensing with output royalty
generates lower profit to the innovator compared to fixed-fee licensing and auction,
regardless of the industry size and/or magnitude of the innovation.2 In view of this
theoretical result, the wide prevalence of output royalty in the licensing contracts (see,
e.g., Taylor and Silberstone, 1973 and Rostoker, 1984) has remained a puzzle. For
example, it is shown in Rostoker (1984) that royalty alone has been used in 39% of
cases, fixed-fee alone for 13% of cases and royalty and fixed-fee for 46% of cases,
among the firms surveyed. Hence, a large fraction of the licensing contracts involving
output royalty has been unexplained by Kamien and Tauman (1984 and 1986), and
has created significant interest in explaining the rationale for using output royalty in
the licensing contracts.
The factors attributed to the presence of output royalty in the licensing
contracts offered by outside innovators 3 are asymmetric information (Gallini and
Wright, 1990, Beggs, 1992, Poddar and Sinha, 2002 and Sen, 2005b), Bertrand
competition (Muto, 1993), spatial competition (Poddar and Sinha, 2004), moral
1

Licensing by the universities or independent research labs to the producers may be the examples of
this scenario.
2
See Kamien (1992) for a nice survey of this literature.
3
Outside innovator refers to the situation were the innovator (who is the licenser) and the licensees do
not compete in the product market.
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hazard (Macho-Stadler et al., 1996 and Cho, 2001), risk aversion (Bousquet et al.,
1998), incumbent innovator (Shapiro, 1985, Kamien and Tauman, 2002 and Sen and
Tauman, 2007), leadership structure (Kabiraj, 2004), strategic incentive delegation
(Saracho, 2002), integer constraint on the number of licenses (Sen, 2005), input
market power (Mukherjee, 2010) and convex costs (Mukherjee, 2010). 4
An important feature of the above mentioned papers, except Muto (1993) and
Poddar and Sinha (2004), is their focus on homogeneous goods, thus ignoring the
effects of product variety. Moreover, Muto (1993) and Poddar and Sinha (2004) fail to
capture the effects of product market competition due to their attention to duopoly
final goods markets.
In a simple model with an outside innovator, we show the implications of
product differentiation and product market competition on fixed-fee and output
royalty in the licensing contracts. In order to understand the implications of product
differentiation and product market competition clearly on the different instruments of
the licensing contracts, we consider licensing with auction where the fixed-fees are
the winning bids of the licensees, and licensing with royalty separately. A simple
extension of our analysis will be to consider a licensing contract combining fixed-fee
and royalty, where all the effects shown in our analysis will interact.
Using the widely used demand structure due to Bowley (1924), where higher
product differentiation increases value of the product to the consumers and enlarges
the final goods market, and with n ≥ 2 potential licensees, which face the same

4

There is a related literature which shows the superiority of royalty licensing and licensing with a
combination of fixed-fee and royalty when the licenser and the licensees compete in the product market
(see, e.g., Rockett, 1990, Wang, 1998 and 2002, Wang and Yang , 1999, Filippini, 2001, Mukherjee
and Balasubramanian, 2001, Faulí-Oller and Sandonis, 2002, Fosfuri, 2004, Kabiraj, 2005, Poddar and
Sinha, 2005 and Mukherjee, 2007). In this literature, the competition softening effect of output royalty
may make the royalty licensing preferable than fixed-fee licensing if the licenser and the licensees
compete in the product market.
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(assumed to be zero, for simplicity) 6 opportunity costs of winning the licenses
irrespective of the licensing contracts, we show that if the outputs of the licensees are
imperfect substitutes, 8 royalty licensing can dominate auction under both Cournot and
Bertrand competition if the number of potential licensees is not very small. We find
that while the relationship between product differentiation and the minimum number
of potential licensees that is required to make the royalty licensing profitable to the
innovator is non-monotonic under Cournot competition, it is positive under Bertrand
competition. Our analysis on welfare implications shows that if the number of
potential licensees is not very small, social welfare is higher under royalty licensing
compared to auction, under both Cournot and Bertrand competition.
Hence, neither the innovator nor the antitrust authority may require
information about the type of product market competition while deciding on the
licensing contract. Further, there may not be a disagreement between the innovator
and the antitrust authority on the preference for a licensing contract.
We have written our results in terms of royalty licensing and auction, where
the fixed-fees are the winning bids of the licensees. It is worth mentioning that, since
the opportunity costs of the licensees in our analysis do not depend on the type of the
licensing contract, there is no difference between an auction and a licensing contract
where the fixed-fee is charged by the innovator (see Kamien et al., 1992). Hence,
whatever we report under auction is also relevant for a fixed-fee licensing.
We have several motivations for considering licensing of a technology where
the opportunity costs of winning the licenses do not depend on the licensing contracts.
6

Zero opportunity costs of winning the licenses occur if the potential licensees either do not produce
other products or production of the new product does not affect the profits from other products.
8
Product differentiation may arise due to product characteristics such as brand name, packaging and
after sales service, which are not dependent on the production technologies (Chamberlin, 1933). Hence,
consumer perception about different firms may be responsible for creating product differentiation.
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First motivation comes immediately from Muto (1993) and Sen and Tauman (2007).
Muto (1993), which is most closely related to our paper, shows that royalty licensing
can dominate either fixed-fee licensing or auction under Bertrand competition if the
licensees’ opportunity costs of winning the licenses depend on the type of licensing
contract (which occurs under non-drastic innovation) 9; however, royalty licensing
cannot dominate fixed-fee licensing or auction under Cournot competition,
irrespective of whether or not the opportunity costs of winning the licenses depend on
the type of the licensing contract (see, Muto, 1988, for the details). Hence, his work
suggests that the innovator’s preference for a licensing contract depend on the type of
product market competition. Therefore, among other things, an outside innovator
needs to know the nature of the product market competition while choosing the patent
licensing contract.
In contrast to Muto (1993), we show that (i) royalty licensing can dominate
auction under Cournot competition with imperfect substitutes, (ii) royalty licensing
can dominate auction under Bertrand competition when the opportunity cost of
winning a license does not depend on the type of the licensing contract , and (iii)
perhaps most importantly, if the number of potential licensees is not very small, the
dominance of the royalty contract over auction does not depend on the type of product
market competition (viz., Coutnot and Bertrand competition) for moderate levels of
product differentiation.
Sen and Tauman (2007) show that, in the case of drastic innovation, an outside
innovator licenses only with a fixed-fee and complete knowledge diffusion does not

9

In the terminology of Muto (1993), this is the case of a non-drastic innovation. Since we have
experienced that some readers are not comfortable with the terms non-drastic and drastic innovations
under product differentiation, we will generally avoid using those terms. Instead we will say whether or
not the opportunity cost of winning a license depends on the type of the licensing contract.
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occur, in the sense that the innovator contracts with only one firm. However, we show
that an outside innovator may prefer to use royalty even for drastic innovations, and
complete knowledge diffusion can occur.
The same (and zero) opportunity costs of the licensees irrespective of the
licensing contract is empirically relevant, giving us the second motivation for
focusing on this situation. For example, the extensive discussion in Greenhalgh and
Rogers (pg. 9, 2010) provide several examples of innovations in which such an
assumption would approximate the real world. As mentioned there, innovations such
as the steam engine or the microprocessor provide examples of drastic innovations.
The invention of laser gave rise to several drastic innovations, such as the compact
disc and the laser printer, based upon which there were a series of non-drastic
innovations.
Finally, we acknowledge that there are situations where the opportunity costs
of the licensees depend on the type of the licensing contract. However, our
assumption of the same opportunity costs of the licensees irrespective of the licensing
contract helps us to prove our point in the simplest way by eliminating the difference
between auction and fixed-fee licensing. Given that Sen and Tauman (2007) show the
presence of royalty in the licensing contracts with homogeneous goods for the nondrastic innovations, it is easy to understand from the market enlargement effect of
product differentiation, discussed below, that our results can be valid even if the
opportunity costs of the licensees depend on the licensing contracts. Hence, given the
existing literature, the detailed analysis of that case will not add much to our
knowledge.
In a Hotelling duopoly model with maximum product differentiation and price
competition, Poddar and Sinha (2004) show that an outside innovator prefers royalty
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licensing than both auction and fixed-fee licensing. However, their analysis does not
shed light on other degrees of product differentiation, other types of product market
competition such as quantity competition, and on oligopolistic product market
competition where the number of licensees is more than two. We analyze all these
issues here. Moreover, demand is perfectly inelastic in Poddar and Sinha (2004),
while quantity demanded varies in our analysis. Our results on price competition are
different from theirs. We show that royalty licensing is dominated by auction if the
products of the licensees have maximum differentiation. However, for other degrees
of product differentiation, royalty can dominate auction (or fixed fee) if the number of
potential licensees is not very small.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We consider the case of
Cournot competition in Section 2. Section 3 shows the implications on Bertrand
competition. Section 4 concludes.

2. Cournot competition
Assume that there is an innovator, called I , who has invented a technology for a new
product. However, I cannot produce the good. There are n ≥ 2 symmetric potential
licensees of the product, and I can license its technology to the potential licensees.
To avoid analytical complexity, we ignore the integer constraint and consider the
number of licensees as a continuous variable, unless specified otherwise.
We assume that no licensee has a technology to produce this product. Hence,
if a licensee does not win a license for this product, it cannot produce the product
irrespective of the licensing contract, and is assumed to earn zero profit, for
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simplicity. Hence, the opportunity costs of the licensees are the same and equal to
zero irrespective of the licensing contract. 11
Assume that a potential licensee can produce the product at a constant
marginal cost, which is assumed to be zero for simplicity, if it wins a license. Further,
it is assumed that the products of the licensees are imperfect substitutes, due to the
factors such as customer switching costs, differences in after-sales service, brand
name, packaging, etc. 12 We consider a demand function due to Bowley (1924), and
assume that the inverse market demand function for the ith licensee is

Pi = a − qi − γ Q−i

(1)

where Pi is price of the ith product, qi is the output of the i th licensee, Q− i is the total
output of all licensees other than the ith licensee and γ ∈ [0,1] shows the degree of
product differentiation. The products are perfect substitutes if γ = 1 , while the
products are completely differentiated for γ = 0 . In this section, we assume that the
competition in the produce market is characterized by Cournot competition.
We consider the following licensing contracts designed by I :
(i)

Royalty licensing, where a fixed royalty payment r per unit of output is
charged by I , and any licensee that wishes to can purchase the license at
this royalty rate.

(ii)

Auctioning k licenses, 1 ≤ k ≤ n , by I through a first price sealed bid
auction. The highest bidders get the license. The ties are resolved by I .

11

The empirical relevance of this has been discussed in the introduction.
As an example of product differentiation, consider the sale of iPhones in the US. Apple (the maker of
iPhones) does not offer cellphone services directly and hence contracts with phone companies for the
sale of iPhones. As per a previous agreement, iPhone users had to subscribe to AT&T but from 2011,
iPhones will also be made available to Verizon subscribers. Notice that iPhones offered through these
two cellphone providers is likely to be imperfect substitutes, due to the different level of services
provided by the service providers.
12
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The innovator can also adopt a contract where it charges a flat pre-determined license
fee F , and any licensee that wishes to can purchase the license at this fixed-fee.
However, it is immediate from Kamien et al. (1992) that the essential difference
between auction and a licensing contract, where the innovation charges the fixed-fee,
stems from the difference in licensees’ opportunity costs of having a license. Since we
are considering a situation with zero opportunity costs of the licensees, this difference
does not arise. Therefore, we focus on auction and do not consider the case where the
innovator charges the fixed-fee.
We consider the following games for our analysis. Under royalty licensing, at
stage 1, I announces the uniform royalty rate r . At stage 2, the licensees
simultaneously and independently decide whether or not to purchase a license. At
stage 3, the licensees choose their outputs simultaneously. If only one licensee
purchases the technology at stage 2, he produces like a monopolist at stage 3.
Under auction, at stage 1, I announces an auction of k licenses, where

1 ≤ k ≤ n . At stage 2, the licensees simultaneously and independently decide whether
or not to purchase a license, and how much to bid. At stage 3, the licensees choose
their outputs simultaneously. If I auctions only one license, the licensee produces
like a monopolist at stage 3. We solve these games by backward induction.

2.1. Royalty licensing
Under royalty licensing, each licensee always prefers to purchase a license for r < a ,
since a licensee has the option of producing nothing after purchasing a license, thus
earning 0 , which is the opportunity cost of having a license.

8

First, we determine the product market equilibrium under royalty licensing. If
I licenses the technology to n licensees and each of the n licensees pays a per-unit
royalty r, where r < a, the i th licensee, i = 1, 2,..., n , chooses his output to maximize
the following expression:

Max(a − qi − γ Q− i − r )qi .

(2)

qi

The equilibrium output of the i th licensee can be found as qiR,C =

a−r
. Hence,
2 + γ ( n − 1)

I maximizes the following expression to determine the equilibrium royalty rate:

Max
r

The equilibrium royalty rate is rC* =

qiR,C =

a

4 + 2γ ( n − 1)

nr (a − r )
.
2 + γ ( n − 1)

(3)

a
. The equilibrium output of the ith licensee is
2

, and the equilibrium payoff of I is

na 2
Π CR =
.
4  2 + γ ( n − 1) 

(4)

2.2. Auction
Now consider the game under auction. If I auctions k licenses, where 1 ≤ k ≤ n , the
output of the i th licensee is qiA,C =

a
. The profit of the i th licensee is
2 + γ ( k − 1)

a2
. Therefore, in the Nash equilibrium of the bidding game, each
[2 + γ ( k − 1)]2

potential licensee bids

a2
. As mentioned in Kamien et al. (1992), if
[2 + γ ( k − 1)]2

k = n, I can guarantee this equilibrium bid by specifying a minimum bid. However,

9

for k < n , the potential licensees bid these amounts even if I does not specify the
minimum bid.
ka 2
If I auctions k licenses, his payoff is Π CA =
, and the number
[2 + γ ( k − 1)]2

of licenses to auction is determined by maximizing the following expression:
ka 2

.

(5)

2 −γ 
, n .
kC* = min 
 γ


(6)

Max
k

 2 + γ ( k − 1) 

2

The equilibrium number of licenses is given by

The profit of I when kC* licenses are being sold under auction is either

or

na 2
,
Π CA =
2
 2 + γ ( n − 1) 

for n ≤

a2
,
Π CA =
4γ ( 2 − γ )

for n >

2−γ

(7a)

γ
2−γ

γ

.

(7b)

2.3. Comparing auction with royalty licensing
First, consider n ≤

2−γ

γ

. In this situation, the profits of the innovator under royalty

licensing and under auction are given by (4) and (7a) respectively. The comparison
shows that Π CR

> A
Π C if
<

n

>2
+1.
<γ
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(8a)

Since we are considering a situation where n ≤

n>

2

γ

+ 1 cannot hold. In other words, if n ≤

2−γ

γ

2−γ

γ

, it is then immediate that

, the innovator is always better off

under auction than under royalty licensing.
The reason for the above result is as follows. If n ≤

2−γ

γ

, the number of

licenses is the same under auction and under royalty licensing. However, royalty
licensing distorts the output of the licensees and also does not allow the innovator to
extract the entire profits of the licensees. Hence, an auction generates higher profit to
the innovator compared to royalty licensing, if the number of licenses is the same
under auction and royalty licensing.
Now consider the case where n ≥

2−γ

γ

. In this situation, the profits of the

innovator under royalty licensing and under auction are given by (4) and (7b)
respectively. The comparison shows that Π CR

n

Since

> A
Π C if
<

> 2−γ
.
< γ (1 − γ )

(8b)

2−γ
2−γ
2−γ
>
, and we are now considering a situation where n >
, it is
γ (1 − γ )
γ
γ

then immediate that innovator prefers royalty licensing to auction if n >

it prefers auction to royalty licensing if n ∈ (

11

2−γ 2−γ
,
).
γ (1 − γ ) γ

2−γ
, but
γ (1 − γ )

We have seen that if n >

2−γ
, the innovator prefers royalty licensing
γ (1 − γ )

compared to auction. However, it follows from (8b) and has also been shown in
Figure 1 that this condition cannot be satisfied for a finite n if the products are either
very much differentiated (i.e., γ → 0 ) or are close substitutes (i.e., γ → 1 ). Further,
we get that right hand side (RHS) of (8b) attains the minimum value at
γ = .59(approx.) , and the minimum value of RHS of (8b) is 5.8 (approx.). Hence, in

order for royalty licensing to generate a higher profit for the innovator compared to
the auction (i.e., to satisfy the condition n >

2−γ
), it is necessary that the number
γ (1 − γ )

of potential licensees be at least 6.
Figure 1 below shows the condition n >

2−γ
for γ ∈ (0,1) and n > 6. It
γ (1 − γ )

follows from the diagram that the innovator earns higher profit under royalty licensing
compared to auction for the intermediate levels of product differentiation, while
auction is more profitable at the extremes.

12


2

1  
40

2−γ
γ (1 − γ )

30
2−γ
γ (1 − γ )

20

Auction

10

n

n
0.2

0.4

Figure 1: Comparison of n and

0.6

0.8



2−γ
for γ ∈ (0,1) and n=10.
γ (1 − γ )

The following result summarizes the above discussion.

Proposition 1: Consider Cournot competition in the product market. Unless the
number of licensees is very small (which is 6 in our analysis), the innovator prefers
royalty licensing compared to auction for intermediate values of γ , but it prefers
auction for low and high values of γ . As n increases, it increases the range of γ over
which the innovator’s profit is higher under royalty licensing compared to auction.

The intuition for the above result is as follows. The comparison between the
innovator’s profits depends on two factors:

13

1. Output distortion effect: A royalty imposes additional marginal costs on the
licensees and results in a reduction of output compared to auction. This factor
makes the royalty contract less attractive to the innovator compared to auction.
2. Market enlargement effect: Given our demand structure, it follows from
Martin (2002) that an increase in the number of producers enlarges the market
size. Hence, if the number of licensees is higher under royalty licensing than
under auction, the market size is also larger under the royalty contract. As a
result, if the number of licensees is higher under royalty, then the market
enlargement effect tends to make the royalty contract more attractive from the
perspective of the innovator.

Overall, the attractiveness of the royalty contract relative to an auction
depends on the relative strength of the two above-mentioned factors. For the
discussion below, recall that the number of licenses under the royalty contract is n

2 −γ 
, n  . First,
but the number of licenses under an auction is given by kC* = min 
 γ

consider the case when the products are significantly differentiated (i.e., when γ is
close to 0). In this situation, the number of licenses is n under both contracts and the
market enlargement effect does not play any role. However, the output distortion
effect operates and this makes the royalty contract less profitable for the innovator
compared to an auction. Second, we consider the other extreme, that is the case in
which the products are sufficiently similar (i.e., when γ is close to 1). In this
situation, the number of licenses is substantially lower under auction compared to
royalty licensing. However, since the products are close substitutes, the profits of the
licensees are low. Hence, the additional fee that the innovator can extract under the
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royalty contract is low as well, i.e., the market enlargement effect is weak in this case.
Hence, the output distortion effect again dominates the market enlargement effect and
the innovator’s profit is higher under auction. Finally, consider the case of moderate
product differentiation. In this situation, the number of licenses is higher under royalty
licensing compared to auction, and the market enlargement effect under royalty
licensing is strong enough to outweigh the royalty licensing’s output distortion effect,
thus making the innovator better off under royalty licensing.
We have shown the effects of product differentiation and product market
competition on the licensing contracts with fixed-fee and output royalty separately.
This allows us to show clearly how the output distortion effect and the market
enlargement effect interact in order to create the preference for a particular
instrument, viz., fixed-fee or output royalty, in the licensing contract. One can also
consider a combination of a fixed fee and a royalty. Since this extension is
straightforward and does not add much to the purpose of this paper, we do not go into
the details of this analysis.

2.4. Welfare
Now we show how product differentiation and product market competition affect
welfare through their effects on fixed-fee and output royalty. Welfare is the sum of
consumer surplus and the total profits of the innovator and the licensees.
It can be shown that consumer surplus under the royalty licensing is

CS =
R
C

a 2 1 + γ ( n − 1)  n
8  2 + γ ( n − 1) 

and consumer surplus under auction is
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2

(7)

CSCA =

a 2 [1 + γ (n − 1)]n
,
2[2 + γ (n − 1)]2

for n ≤

CSCA =

a 2 ( 3 − 2γ )
,
8γ ( 2 − γ )

for n ≥

2−γ

γ
2−γ

γ

.

(8a)

.

(8b)

Further, welfare under royalty licensing is
R
W
=
CSCR + Π CR + n ( qiR,C )
C

2

(9)

and under auction is
A
W
=
CSCA + Π CA .
C

(10)

Note that there are three terms in the right hand side of (9) but only two terms in (10).
This is because the net profits of the licensees are positive under royalty licensing,
while their net profits are zero under auction.
First, consider the case where n ≤

2−γ

γ

. By comparing (8a) and (10), it

follows that the consumer surplus is higher under auction than under royalty
licensing. Further, it has been discussed above that the profit of the innovator is also
higher under auction in this case, since

2−γ

γ

<

2−γ
. However, the profit of each
γ (1 − γ )

licensee is positive under royalty licensing while it is 0 under auction. The
comparison of (9) and (10) shows that the higher total net profits of the licensees
under royalty licensing compared to auction are not high enough to outweigh the
lower consumer surplus and the lower profit of the innovator under royalty licensing
compared to auction. Hence, welfare is higher under auction compared to royalty
licensing for n ≤

2−γ

γ

.
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Now consider the case where n >

2−γ

γ

. In this situation, consumer surplus is

higher under auction than under royalty licensing, and the profit of the innovator may
be higher or lower under auction than under royalty licensing depending on whether n
is lower or higher than

2−γ
. However, the total net profits of the licensees are
γ (1 − γ )

higher under royalty licensing than under auction. It can be shown that, for a given γ ,
welfare is higher under royalty licensing (auction) for

n > (< )

(2 − γ )(3 − γ 29 + γ (−34 + 9γ ))
≡ nC* .
2γ (1 − γ )

It can be checked that nC* ≥

2−γ

γ

(13)

. 13 It follows from nC* that (13) cannot hold for γ = 1

and γ = 0 , 14 while it may hold for intermediate values of γ . Further, we get that in
order for n to be greater than nC* , it is necessary that n ≥ 17 .
The next proposition summarizes the result on welfare.

Proposition 2: Consider Cournot competition in the product market. Unless the
number of potential licenses is very small (which is 17 in our analysis), welfare is
higher under royalty licensing compared to auction for moderate values of γ , but it is
higher under auction for high and low values of γ . As n increases from 17, it
increases the range of γ over which welfare is higher under royalty licensing
compared to auction.

13

It may worth noting that the demand intercept, a, does not arise in (13) since it gets cancelled under
comparison.
14
In fact, (13) does not hold for reasonable values of n if γ is either close to 0 or it is close to 1. For
example, if γ = .1 , (13) holds provided n is at least 85.
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The intuition for the above result is as follows. The effect of different
licensing contracts on welfare also depends on the trade off created by the output
distortion effect and the market enlargement effect. The output distortion effect tends
to reduce welfare under the royalty licensing compared to auction, and the market
enlargement effect tends to create the opposite effect. If the products of the firms are
sufficiently differentiated (i.e., if γ is close to 0), the number of licenses under
auction is close to the number of licenses under auction and hence the market
enlargement effect is small. Hence, in this case, the output distortion effect is the
dominant effect and this results in a higher welfare under an auction. Conversely, if
the products are sufficiently similar (i.e., if γ is close to 1), even if the number of
licenses are higher under royalty licensing compared to auction, the market
enlargement effect is very weak since the products are close substitutes. In this
situation, again the output distortion effect dominates the market enlargement effect,
and results in a higher welfare under auction compared to royalty licensing. It is only
for intermediate values of γ that the market enlargement effect can be strong enough
to outweigh the output distortion effect, thus resulting in higher welfare under royalty
licensing compared to auction.
Propositions 1 and 2 together show that if the number of potential licensees is
sufficiently large and if the degree of product differentiation is moderate, both the
innovator and the society prefer royalty licensing. Thus, we show the effects of
product market competition and product variety in determining the privately and
socially preferred licensing contracts.

18

3. Bertrand competition
The purpose of this section is to show that our main results of the previous section
occur even under Bertrand competition. Thus, we show that if the number of potential
licensees is not very small, both the innovator and society can be better off under
royalty licensing irrespective of the type of product market competition.
Given the inverse demand function (1), the demand function for firm i is:

qi =

a (1 − γ ) − 1 + ( n − 2 ) γ  pi + γ ∑ j ≠i p j

(1 − γ ) 1 + ( n − 1) γ 

.

(14)

In order to avoid the well known “Bertrand paradox”, we will mainly concentrate on
γ ∈ [0,1) in this section.

3.1 Royalty licensing
First, determine the product market equilibrium under royalty licensing. If I licenses
the technology to n licensees and each of the n licensees pays a per-unit output
royalty r, where r < a, the equilibrium output of the i th licensee, i = 1, 2,..., n , is
qiR, B =

( a − r ) 1 + ( n − 2 ) γ 
.
(1 − γ ) 1 + ( n − 1) γ 

Hence, I

maximizes the following expression to

determine the equilibrium royalty rate:
Max
r

nr ( a − r ) 1 + ( n − 2 ) γ 

(1 − γ ) 1 + ( n − 1) γ 

The equilibrium royalty rate is rB* =

qiR, B =

a 1 + ( n − 2 ) γ 

2 (1 − γ ) 1 + ( n − 1) γ 

.

(15)

a
. The equilibrium output of the ith licensee is
2

, and the equilibrium payoff of I is
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na 2 1 + ( n − 2 ) γ 

.
Π =
4 1 + ( n − 1) γ   2 + ( n − 3) γ 
R
B

(16)

3.2. Auction
Now consider the game under auction. If I auctions k licenses, where 1 ≤ k ≤ n , the
output of the i th licensee is qiA, B =

licensee is

1 + ( k − 1) γ  [ 2 + (k − 3)γ ]

a 2 (1 − γ ) 1 + ( k − 2 ) γ 

1 + ( k − 1) γ   2 + ( k − 3) γ 

licensee bids

a 1 + ( k − 2 ) γ 

2

and the profit of the i th

. Therefore, in equilibrium, each potential

a 2 (1 − γ ) 1 + ( k − 2 ) γ 

1 + ( k − 1) γ   2 + ( k − 3) γ 

2

. If

k = n, I

can guarantee this

equilibrium bid by specifying a minimum bid. However, for k < n , the licensees bid
these amounts even if I does not specify the minimum bid.

a 2 k (1 − γ ) 1 + ( k − 2 ) γ 

If I auctions k licenses, his payoff is Π =
, and
2
1 + ( k − 1) γ   2 + ( k − 3) γ 
A
B

the number of licenses to auction is determined by maximizing the following
expression:

a 2 k (1 − γ ) 1 + ( k − 2 ) γ 

1 + ( k − 1) γ   2 + ( k − 3) γ 

2

.

(17)

Since we cannot find a closed form solution for the above maximization problem, in
the following analysis, we solve for the optimal value of k numerically.
We consider three values of γ : γ = .1 , γ = .5 and γ = .9 . Thus, we consider
very low, very high and intermediate values of γ . We get that the equilibrium number
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of licenses as k B* (=
γ .1)
= 18 , k B* (=
γ .9)
γ .5)
= 1 . 15 Hence, as product
= 2 and k B* (=
differentiation increases, i.e., as γ reduces, the equilibrium number of licenses under
auction increases. The corresponding profits of I are ∏ BA (γ =.1) =1.27347 a 2 ,
∏ BA (γ =.5) =.296296a 2 and ∏ BA (γ =.9) =.25a 2 .

3.3. Comparing auction with royalty licensing
Now compare the profits of the innovator under auction and royalty licensing for
γ = .1 , γ = .5 and γ = .9 . We get that the corresponding profits of the innovator under

royalty

licensing

Π (γ =.5) =
R
B

Π (γ =.9) =
R
B

are

Π BR (γ =.1) =

na 2 1 + (.1) ( n − 2 ) 

4 1 + (.1) ( n − 1)   2 + (.1) ( n − 3) 

,

na 2 1 + (.5) ( n − 2 ) 

and

na 2 1 + (.9) ( n − 2 ) 

. In all these cases, the profit of the

4 1 + (.5) ( n − 1)   2 + (.5) ( n − 3) 

4 1 + (.9) ( n − 1)   2 + (.9) ( n − 3) 

innovator is higher under royalty licensing than under auction if the number of the
potential licensees is sufficiently large. Royalty licensing is better for the innovator
for n ≥ 20 if γ = .1 , for n ≥ 4 if γ = .5 and for n ≥ 3 if γ = .9 . Therefore, given a
degree of product differentiation, the innovator prefers royalty licensing compared to
auction if the number of potential licensees is sufficiently large.
Further, as the degree of product differentiation increases, i.e., as γ reduces,
the minimum number of potential licensees required to make royalty licensing more
profitable to the innovator compared to an auction increases as well. Under Cournot
competition, the minimum number of potential licensees required to make royalty
15

We are considering the number of firms as integers.

21

licensing more attractive compared to auction depends on

2−γ
. Notice that this
γ (1 − γ )

term is non-monotonic in γ . Hence, the result obtained under Bertrand competition
contrasts with the one obtained under Cournot competition.
The following proposition summarizes the above discussion.

Proposition 3: Consider Bertrand competition in the product market. For a given
γ ∈ (0,1) , the innovator is better off under royalty licensing compared to auction if

the number of potential licensees is sufficiently large. Further, the minimum number
of potential licensees that is required to make the innovator better off under royalty
licensing increases if γ reduces.

Proposition 3 does not incorporate the cases of γ = 0 and γ = 1 . If γ = 0 , that
is, if the products of the licensees are completely differentiated, the innovator licenses
to all of the potential licensees under both auction and royalty licensing, and is better
off under auction. On the other hand, if γ = 1 , i.e., if the products are perfect

a2
substitutes, the innovator will sell one license under auction, and will earn
.
4
a2
However, if γ = 1 , the profit of the innovator under royalty licensing will also be
.
4
Hence, the innovator is indifferent between auction and royalty licensing if γ = 1 .
This is in line with Kamien (1992).

3.4 Welfare

22

Now we compare welfare under royalty licensing and auction, and show that welfare
can be higher under royalty licensing.
It can be shown that consumer surplus under royalty licensing is
CS BR =

n [1 + γ (n − 1) ] ( qir, P )

2

(18)

2

and under auction is
CS BA =

k [1 + γ (k − 1) ] ( qiF, P )

2

2

.

(19)

Further, welfare under the royalty licensing is
R
W
CS BR + Π BR + n ( qiR,B )
=
B

2

(20)

and under auction is
A
W
=
CS BA + Π BA .
B

(21)

In general, welfare can go either way. In Figure 2 below, we plot welfare under
royalty licensing and under auction for a = 10 and n = 30 . Figure 2 shows that
welfare is higher under auction for low values of γ but it is higher under royalty
licensing for high values of γ .
Figure 2 along with Proposition 3 shows that if the number of potential
licensees is sufficiently large, both the innovator and society can be better off under
royalty licensing compared to auction if the products are not very much differentiated.
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Figure 2: Welfare comparison under Bertrand competition for a = 10 and n = 30.

4. Conclusion
We consider technology licensing by an outside innovator, and show the effects of
product differentiation and competition (given by the number of licensees producing
in the market) on the innovator’s profit and social welfare. We show that both the
innovator and the society can be better off under royalty licensing compared to
auction if the number of potential licensees is sufficiently large. We find that the
relationship between product differentiation and the minimum number of potential
licensees that is required to make the royalty licensing profitable to the innovator is
non-monotonic under Cournot competition, while it is positive under Bertrand
competition.
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Hence, our analysis suggests that if the number of potential licensees is large,
there is a wide range of the product differentiation parameter in which the innovator
and the antitrust authority both prefer the royalty contract, regardless of the type of
product market competition.
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